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Abstract 
A federated database is comprised of multiple intercon- 
nected databases that cooperate in an autonomous fash- 
ion. Global integrity constraints are very useful in feder- 
ated databases, but the lack of global queries, global trans- 
action mechanisms, and global concurrency control renders 
traditional constraint management techniques inapplicable. 
This paper presents a threefold contribution to  integrity con- 
straint checking in federated databases: (1) The problem 
of constraint checking in a federated database environment 
is clearly formulated. (2) A family of cooperative proto- 
cols for constraint checking is presented. (3) The differences 
across protocols in the family are analyzed with respect t o  
system requirements, properties guaranteed, and costs in- 
volved. Thus, we provide a suite of options with protocols 
for various environments with specific system capabilities 
and integrity requirements. 
1 Introduction 
The integration of multiple database systems is fast be- 
coming one of the most important topics in both the 
research and commercial database communities. Infor- 
mation servers are being developed that provide inte- 
grated access to  multiple data sources. Legacy database 
systems are being coupled to  form enterprise-wide infor- 
mation systems. Large workflow management applica- 
tions require routing information through multiple au- 
tonomous local systems. The integration of autonomous 
database systems into loosely-coupled federations re- 
quires the development of novel database management 
techniques specific to  these environments. 
One important issue in federated database systems 
is checking integri ty  constraints over data from multi- 
ple sites in the federation. In a federated environment, 
integrity constraints might specify that replicated infor- 
mation is not contradictory, that  certain referential in- 
tegrity constraints hold, or that some other condition is 
true over multiple databases. In centralized or tightly- 
coupled distributed databases, transactions form the 
cornerstone of integrity constraint checking: Before a 
transaction commits, it ensures that all constraints are 
valid. If a constraint is violated, then the transaction 
may be aborted, the constraint may be corrected au- 
tomatically, or an error condition may be raised [8]. 
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Unfortunately, the lack of inter-site transaction mech- 
anisms in federated databases renders traditional con- 
straint checking mechanisms inapplicable. 
This paper addresses the problem of integrity con- 
straint checking in federated databases with a three- 
fold contribution. First, the constraint checking prob- 
lem is formulated in the specific context of federated 
databases. In particular, an alternative notion of cor- 
rectness must be defined, since the transaction-based 
approach from traditional environments is inappropri- 
ate. Then a family of cooperative constraint checking 
protocols is developed along four protocol “dimensions.” 
Finally, the protocols in the family are analyzed and 
compared with respect to the requirements of the com- 
ponent database systems, the constraint checking prop- 
erties guaranteed by the protocols, and the processing 
and communication costs. By providing a family of pro- 
tocols, we permit a protocol in the family to  be chosen 
and tailored for the capabilities and requirements of a 
particular environment. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Below, we 
first give an outline of related research. Then, Section 2 
formalizes the problem of integrity constraint checking 
in federated databases, describes the context of the work 
in this paper, and introduces a simple example applica- 
tion. Section 3 presents the family of constraint check- 
ing protocols we have developed. Section 4 analyzes 
the family of protocols by further inspecting the “de- 
sign space” for protocols and comparing the developed 
protocols. Finally, we describe how the protocols can 
be extended to more general architectures. In Section 5 
we conclude and discuss future work. 
1.1 Related Work 
Most work addressing the problem of integrity con- 
straint checking in multidatabase environments has con- 
sidered tightly-coupled distributed databases in which 
global queries, global transactions, and global concur- 
rency control are present, e.g., [7, 15, 181. Since these 
approaches rely on global services that typically are un- 
available in federated databases, they are inappropri- 
ate for the environment we consider. Note that some 
approaches focus on relaxing the traditional notion of 
transaction serializability for constraints in distributed 
environments, e.g., 131, but some level of locking and 
global query facilities is still expected. 
A few recent papers have addressed the issue of moni- 
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toring constraints in loosely-coupled and sometimes het- 
erogeneous database environments. One class of work 
involves local constraint  checking-deriving tests whose 
success over one database implies the validity of a mul- 
tidatabase constraint [l, 11, 121. Local tests optimize 
the constraint checking process, but they still require 
a conventional (non-local) method when the local test 
fails. As will be seen, in this paper we develop proto- 
cols that integrate local checking with non-local meth- 
ods. In [5], a framework and toolkit are described for 
constraint management in loosely-coupled, highly het- 
erogeneous environments. The focus is on maintaining 
constraints across systems that have varying capabilities 
and varying “willingness” to participate in constraint 
checking protocols, on describing the timing properties 
associated with constraint checking, and on notions of 
“conditional consistency” that are weaker than the form 
of consistency we consider. The issue of maintaining 
consistency of replicated data across loosely-coupled, 
semantically heterogeneous databases has been consid- 
ered in, e.g., [4, 6, 171. In [4], a method is described 
that relies on active rules and persistent queues, similar 
to the simplest case in our family of protocols. Similar 
issues are addressed in [17], but no specific protocols are 
provided. In [6], an active rules mechanism is proposed 
for maintaining replication consistency. 
Finally, we note that in the field of distributed (oper- 
ating) systems there has been considerable work in the 
area of snapshots  and consis tent  global states,  e.g., [2]. 
Although this work appears highly related to the prob- 
lem we address, there are two significant differences: (1) 
The conditions to be evaluated in the distributed system 
setting are stable, i.e. once a condition becomes valid, 
it stays valid. This property is not true of database 
integrity constraints. (2) Protocols for the distributed 
system setting are designed to obtain some (any) global 
state, but not to obtain all global states. In contrast, 
to monitor database constraints it is necessary to mon- 
itor all global states, or at  least a subset of those states 
corresponding to consistency “checkpoints”. 
2 Preliminaries 
This section presents preliminary material for the re- 
mainder of the paper. First, the concepts used in our 
work are defined formally. Next, we present the basic 
architecture we consider and discuss implementation as- 
pects of the architecture. Then we describe the class of 
integrity constraints considered. The section ends with 
the description of an example application used to moti- 
vate our work. Although we cast our work in the context 
of federations of relational databases, the relational con- 
text is introduced primarily for concreteness and clarity. 
The work easily adapts to other data models. 
2.1 Concepts and Definitions 
Definition 1. A federated relational database s y s t e m  
F is a set of n interconnected autonomous database 
systems {SI,. . . ,Sn}. Each system S, E F hosts a 
local database D, with schema D,. A local database 
D, consists of relations R4, . . . , RR, with schemata 
R2,. . . ,Rkz. The set of all relation schemata Ri in 
F is called the global database schema 4 of F .  
In the following, we assume a global clock so that we can 
refer to global times in defining certain concepts. The 
global clock is used for concept definition only-it is 
not a requirement of the federated database systems we 
consider. Also for definitional purposes, we assume that 
each local database processes its updates in the context 
of local transactions. However, many of the constraint 
checking protocols we present are also applicable to lo- 
cal systems that do not support transactions. 
Definition 2. The user-observable state of a relation 
Ri at global time t is the state of Ri reflecting all and 
only those local update transactions committed before 
t at site S,. The global s tate  G of a global database 
schema Q at global time t is the set of user-observable 
states of all relations in G at global time t. 
Due to the lack of global transactions in a federated en- 
vironment, it can be difficult or impossible to observe 
the state of a global database at  a single global time. 
If an application or protocol does not read local states 
simultaneously, it may observe a global state that has 
never actually existed. We call such an observed state 
a p h a n t o m  state. 
Definition 3. A p h a n t o m  state  @ of a global database 
schema 4 observed by application A at time t 2  as a con- 
sequence of a request (or set of requests) by A at time 
tl is a set of states of all relations in 4 such that there 
exists no t 3  where tl < t 3  < t 2  and the global state of 
4 at time t 3  is @. 
Next, we turn to  the definition of global integrity con- 
straints. 
Definition 4. A global integri ty  constraint I is a 
boolean expression over a global database schema 4 ,  
i.e., a function I Q + { t r u e ,  f a l s e } .  A global integrity 
constraint cannot be expressed over a local database 
schema D2 E G. A constraint checking protocol for I is 
an algorithm for evaluating I. 
In centralized database systems or tightly-coupled dis- 
tributed database systems, the transitions between 
database states are determined by transactions. Con- 
sequently, integrity constraints generally are required 
to hold in the states immediately preceding and follow- 
ing each transaction. Since federated environments con- 
sist of multiple, autonomous database systems lacking 
global transactions, we must rely on other concepts to 
determine the global database states that should satisfy 
the integrity constraints. We define a notion sf global 
states in which the federated system is “at rest.” These 
quiescent states correspond roughly to the before and af- 
ter transaction states in traditional database systems, 
and are the states in which we want to ensure that in- 
tegrity constraints hold. 
0 
0 
0 
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Definit ion 5. A federated database system F is in a 
quiescent s tate  at time t if all local update transactions 
submitted before t have committed, and all constraint 
checking protocols triggered by any updates before t 
have completed. 0 
Note that,  similar to  the before and after transaction 
states in traditional systems, quiescent states may not 
physically exist. However, the logical notion of such 
states is appropriate for defining the correctness of in- 
tegrity constraint checking. Two important properties 
of constraint checking protocols are defined with respect 
to  quiescent states: safety  and accuracy. 
Definit ion 6.  Consider a global database schema 9 
and a global integrity constraint I over 9. A constraint 
checking protocol for I is safe if the transition from any 
quiescent global database state Go E 9 that satisfies I 
to  any other quiescent state G1 E S that does not sat- 
isfy I always results in the protocol raising an alarm.’ 
A constraint checking protocol for I is accurate if, af- 
ter any quiescent global database state Go at time t o ,  
a protocol-generated alarm at time t z  implies the exis- 
tence of a global database state G1 at time tl such that 
t o  < tl 5 t z  and G1 does not satisfy I .  
That is, a protocol is safe if it detects every transition 
to  a quiescent state in which the constraint becomes 
violated. We assume that safety is required of any con- 
straint checking protocol that will be useful in practice. 
A safe protocol may be “pessimistic,” however, in the 
sense that it raises too many alarms. A protocol is ac- 
curate if, whenever an alarm is raised, there is indeed 
a state in which the constraint is violated. Although 
accuracy is a desirable feature of a constraint checking 
protocol, it is not always necessary. Our last definition 
involves the representation of database updates. 
Definit ion 7. Consider a relation R in a local database 
system of a federation. When R is modified, we use AR 
to denote all modified tuples (inserted, deleted, or up- 
dated), A+R to  denote all new tuple values (inserts and 
after-images of updates), A-R to denote all old tuple 
values (deletes and before-images of updates), and AoR 
to denote all unmodified tuples. We refer t o  all forms 
of A’s as delta sets. We assume that delta sets corre- 
spond to  the modifications performed by a single local 
transaction, however other update granularities can be 
used without affecting our protocols. 
2.2 Basic Archi tec ture  
Figure 1 depicts the basic architecture we address for 
integrity constraint checking in federated databases. To 
develop our protocols we consider the restricted case of 
two databases, each containing a single relation. How- 
ever, our protocols can be generalized to  handle con- 
straints over more than two sites-see Section 4.2 for a 
0 
0 
‘In this paper we do not consider the reaction to constraint 
violations. Rather, we focus on the detection of constraint vi- 
olations, and we say that when a protocol detects a constraint 
violation it raises an “alarm.” 
r - - - - - - 1  r - - - - - - 1  
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Figure 1: Basic architecture 
discussion. Generalizing to  more than one relation per 
site is straightforward. 
In the diagram, DER and DES denote two local 
database systems managing relations R and S, respec- 
tively. Connected to the local database systems are con- 
straint managers  CMR and CMs.  There is one con- 
straint manager for each local database handling the 
global constraints that  may be invalidated by opera- 
tions on its corresponding database. Consequently, each 
global constraint is replicated at every site containing 
data involved in the constraint. We assume that any 
local constraints are managed within the appropriate 
database system (see, e.g., [SI). 
The constraint manager is notified of all changes 
(A’s) to  the local database that may violate a con- 
straint. For convenience, we may assume that delta no- 
tifications are sent at the end of each local update trans- 
action; however, any granularity of delta notification 
can be handled by our protocols. Of particular impor- 
tance is that  we do not generally assume that delta no- 
tifications or subsequent constraint checking protocols 
occur as part of a local transaction, and constraint man- 
agers need not be tightly coupled with their correspond- 
ing database systems. The database systems in the fed- 
eration are autonomous, in that global queries, global 
transactions, and global concurrency control mecha- 
nisms are not available. A message-passing interface 
connects the two sites. This interface allows the con- 
straint managers to  exchange messages in a cooperative 
fashion, and may allow a constraint manager to  send 
requests directly to the remote database system. 
An essential aspect of implementing the above archi- 
tecture is supporting the delta notification mechanism 
by which database systems in a federation communi- 
cate with their respective constraint managers. Sev- 
eral implementation schemes can be used to  realize 
this mechanism. Database rules following the euent- 
conditzon-actaon (ECA) paradigm are currently sup- 
ported by many active database systems [19]. These 
rules can be used to  implement the delta notification 
mechanism in a straightforward way. For database sys- 
tems that do not include an active rule manager, pas- 
sive rules can be used-passive rules are processed by 
a transaction modification component built on top of 
a conventional database system [9, 141. Database trig- 
gers as supported by many recent commercial database 
systems can be used in a similar way to  rules. Finally, 
in cases where no triggering mechanism is available at 
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system 
SA 
SB 
SA 
involve relations at two different sites. Constraint Cz 
is a local constraint, so it can be enforced at its local 
site (SA)  using standard methods. Constraints Cl and 
Cs can each be “factored” into two incremental global 
constraints, dealing with relevant updates to each of the 
two relations: 
relation 
PatientSA S S N ,  Name, Physician - 
PatzentsB ( (SSN,  Name, Physician)) 
Physzcians(PhN, Name) 
3 The Family of Protocols 
In this section, we develop a family of cooperative 
constraint checking protocols suitable for federated 
databases. The members of this family have different 
requirements, different properties, and different perfor- 
mance characteristics. The “root” of the family is a very 
simple protocol, described in Section 3.1. In Sections 
3.2-3.5 we enhance the simple protocol to obtain more 
useful protocols. In designing the protocols, we are es- 
pecially interested in the safety and accuracy properties 
as defined in Section 2.1. The root of the protocol family 
is safe, and so are all of the protocols derived from it. To 
obtain accuracy, we enhance the root protocol along the 
dimensions of t imes tamping  mechanisms and local trans-  
act ion mechanisms. Timestamping mechanisms anno- 
tate delta sets and query results with global timestamps, 
enabling the algorithm to  detect when phantom states 
may have been used in constraint evaluation. In con- 
trast, local transaction mechanisms can be used to pre- 
vent the evaluation of constraints over phantom states. 
In addition to safety and accuracy, we also are inter- 
ested in the performance of the protocols, and in ensur- 
ing that the local databases remain as autonomous as 
possible. For these purposes, we enhance the protocols 
along the dimensions of change logging mechanisms and 
local t e s t  mechanisms. Change logging mechanisms ac- 
cumulate updates in special purpose data sets SO that 
database updating and constraint checking need not oc- 
cur at the same granularity. Local test mechanisms 
check global constraints by accessing local data only 
(whenever possible), thus avoiding any kind of global 
coordination. 
These four dimensions delineate a “design space” for 
constraint checking protocols. In the remainder of this 
section, the various protocols are developed, beginning 
with the simple protocol at the “origin” of the design 
space. For the specification of a protocol, we use a table 
that contains a set of sequentially occurring steps. Each 
step is performed by an actor-a database system or a 
constraint manager. Associated with each step is an 
action. Actions vary from simple query evaluations or 
messaging commands to  more complex behavior. For 
the illustration of a protocol, we use a figure showing 
how the protocol behaves within the context of the basic 
architecture introduced earlier in Figure 1. 
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C M R  receive AR from D B R  
D B s  
send Q(AR, S )  t o  DBs 
receive Q(AR, S )  from C M R  
evaluate Q(AR, S) 
send query result to C M R  
receive query result from D B s  
Table 2: DRQ Protocol 
C M R  
r - - - - - - i  r - - - - - - i  
Figure 2: DRQ Protocol 
3.1 DRQ and IRQ Protocols  
The Direct R e m o t e  Q u e r y  Protocol (DRQ) is specified in 
Table 2 and depicted in Figure 2. Table 2 specifies how 
the protocol responds to  a delta notification for relation 
R. A symmetric protocol is used to  handle updates 
to  S. Protocols handling updates to  R and to  S may 
run concurrently. We will assume that multiple updates 
to  R or to  S are handled sequentially, although this 
assumption is not strictly necessary. Figure 2 illustrates 
the protocol for both updates to  R and to  S .  
The DRQ protocol is very simple: When the con- 
straint manager is notified of an update, it sends the ap- 
propriate incremental query for evaluation at the other 
site. Delta sets are usually small enough that the actual 
data can be transmitted in a straightforward way. For 
example, Q(AR, S )  may by a query over S with the val- 
ues from AR “plugged in.” If the query result is non- 
empty, then the constraint manager raises an alarm. 
The DRQ protocol always detects when a constraint is 
violated, i.e., it is safe. Unfortunately, DRQ can easily 
produce “false alarms,” i.e., it is inaccurate. 
To show that the DRQ protocol is safe, we show that 
starting from a quiescent consistent global state DO at 
time to ,  a quiescent inconsistent global state D, at time 
t ,  cannot be reached without an alarm being raised: (1) 
At least one update must have occurred between times 
t o  and t ,  to  reach an inconsistent quiescent state D, 
from consistent state Do. (2) Assume that update u1 
occurring at time t l ,  to < tl < t,, is the last such 
update producing an inconsistent state. (3) Update u1 
triggers a constraint checking process that does not raise 
an alarm, so there exists a time t 2 ,  tl < t z  < t,, at 
which the state is consistent. (4) Since the state at t ,  
is inconsistent, there must be an update u2 at time t 3 ,  
t 2  < t 3  < t,, that causes the inconsistent state. This 
contradicts the fact that u1 is the last update invalidat- 
ing the constraint. 
The inaccuracy of DRQ can be easily be shown by a 
Figure 3: IRQ Protocol 
counterexample in which an alarm is raised but there 
is never an inconsistent global state [lo]. Inaccuracy is 
due to  the fact that the DRQ protocol may evaluate 
the constraint over a phantom state, since relations R 
and S are accessed at different times. We can solve the 
problem in two ways, by detectzon or by prevent ion:  (1) 
We can use timestamping information to  detect possible 
evaluation over phantom states. (2) We can exploit lo- 
cal transaction mechanisms to  prevent evaluation over 
phantom states. The first solution is explored in Sec- 
tion 3.2, the second solution in Section 3.3. First, a 
slight variation on the DRQ protocol is presented. 
The DRQ protocol relies on the capability of each 
database system to process queries issued from a re- 
mote constraint manager. If remote query services are 
unavailable, then we can use a variation on the DRQ 
protocol that uses peer-to-peer communication between 
the constraint managers. This Indirect R e m o t e  Query  
Protocol (IRQ) is illustrated in Figure 3. For clarity, the 
figure (and all protocol figures to  follow) only shows the 
case where R is updated. The case where S is updated 
is symmetric in all protocols. Like the DRQ protocol, 
the IRQ protocol is safe but inaccurate. 
3.2 T R Q  and SRQ Protocols  
The DRQ and IRQ protocols lack the accuracy property 
because they cannot distinguish true global states from 
phantom states. To overcome this problem, we first 
enhance the IRQ protocol with a timestamping tech- 
nique. This technique allows the constraint manager to  
detect when a phantom state may have been used for 
query evaluation, and to  reevaluate queries when this 
happens. To make the protocol more efficient, when 
reevaluation is necessary it is performed with a cumula-  
tzve delta set ,  i.e., a delta set combining multiple delta 
notifications from a single site with n e t  effect semantics. 
The Times tamped  R e m o t e  Q u e r y  Protocol (TRQ) is 
specified in Table 3 and depicted in Figure 4. In the fig- 
ure and the table, the t , ’~  denote timestamps attached 
to  messages, and AR@t and A S @ t  denote notifications 
of updates occurring at time t .  Assume for now that 
a synchronous global clock is used to  generate times- 
tamps; we discuss later how this assumption can be re- 
laxed. The TRQ protocol requires that the interface 
between each constraint manager and its database sys- 
tem is order preserving. In particular, a query result 
sent to  the constraint manager must follow the notifica- 
tion of a relevant update if that update was performed 
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i p q  i 
DBR 
C M R  receive (AR,t l )  from DBR 
C M s  
D B s  
send (AR,  t i )  to C M R  
send (Q(AR, S ) ,  t i )  to CMs 
receive (Q(AR, S ) ,  t i )  from C M R  
submit Q(AR, S )  to D B s  
receive Q(AR, S )  from C M s  
evaluate Q(AR, S )  
send query result to C M s  
receive query result from D B s  at t z  
IF (3t3)(AS@t3 A ti < t3 < t z )  
THEN send (queryresult, busy, t 3 )  to CMR 
ELSE send (queryresult, quiet) to C M R  
receive query result and status from C M s  
IF status=quiet OR ($tr)(AR@t? A tl < t 4  < t 3 )  
THEN raise alarm if query result IS non-empty 
ELSE restart from step 2 with cumulative AR 
C M s  
C M R  
L - - - - - - - - - A  L - - - - - - - - - J  
Figure 4: TRQ Protocol 
before the query was evaluated. 
The TRQ protocol behaves as follows. When con- 
straint manager CMR is notified of an update to R, it 
sends the appropriate incremental query Q for evalua- 
tion to constraint manager CMs,  along with a times- 
tamp for the update. CMs requests evaluation of query 
Q at database DBs .  If an update occurs to S between 
the time of R’s update and the evaluation of Q ,  then 
CMs returns a busy status to CMR (rather than a quiet 
status) along with the query answer. Consider what 
happens when CMR receives the answer. If the return 
status is quiet then there have been no relevant updates 
to S and the query has been evaluated over a true global 
state. If the return status is busy then there have been 
relevant updates to S .  However, if R has not been up- 
dated further, then the query still has been evaluated 
over a true global state. In the case where there have 
been further updates to R, then the query may have 
been evaluated over a phantom state, and it must be 
reevaluated. Reevaluation takes place by restarting the 
protocol; for efficiency, the original and new updates to 
R are combined before restarting. Note that, provided 
that updates to R and S eventually cease, termination 
of the protocol is guaranteed since protocol restarts are 
triggered only by new updates. 
Safety of the TRQ protocol follows the same line of 
reasoning as safety for the DRQ protocol. We show 
that the TRQ protocol is accurate by arguing that ev- 
ery successful (i.e., not restarted) query evaluation is 
performed in a true global state: (1) After an update 
AR at time t l ,  tl is the first “candidate” global state 
for evaluation of &. If evaluation does not produce a 
12 
1 I D B R  send AR within tA to C M a  
IF status=quiet OR 
THEN raise alarm if query result is non-empty 
ELSE restart from step 2 with cumulative AR 
(&)(AR@t4 A tl < t 4  A t4 - t A  < t3) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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c M R  
C M s  
D B s  
receive AR from D B ~  at t;‘ 
send (Q(AR,S), t l  - t A )  to C M s  
receive (Q(AR,S), t l  - t A )  from C M R  
submit Q(AR, S) to D B s  
receive Q(AR, S )  from C M s  
evaluate &(AR, 5’) 
send query result to C M s  
receive query result from DBs at t z  
IF (33)(AS@tj A tl - t A  < t3 < t z )  
THEN send (queryresult, busy, t3) to C M R  
ELSE send (queryresult, quiet) to C M R  
receive query result and status from C M R  
C M s  
CMR 
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Figure 5: TRT Protocol 
(TRT) is depicted in Figure 5. In the figure, the en- 
closure of a query in square brackets indicates that the 
query is to  be executed within its own local transaction. 
The TRT protocol behaves as follows. When DBR 
performs a delta notification, this notification occurs as 
part of the transaction r that updated R, and T does not 
commit until it receives a “release” message from the 
constraint manager. That is, transaction T continues to  
hold its exclusive lock (X-lock) on R while the protocol 
runs. This approach requires that the database sys- 
tem is capable of performing a notification and waiting 
for an acknowledgment, all within a single transaction. 
This capability is provided by most database systems 
supporting triggers or active rules [19]; see Section 2.2. 
Once CMR has received the delta notification, it sends 
the appropriate query to  DBs,  to  be executed within 
its own transaction T‘ at DBs. During execution of the 
query, r’ will hold a shared lock (S-lock) on S. When 
the query answer is received by CMR,  an alarm is raised 
if the result is non-empty, and the pending transaction 
r at D B R  is released. 
Safety of the TRT protocol follows the same line of 
reasoning as for the other protocols. Accuracy of the 
TRT protocol results from the fact that every query is 
evaluated over a true global state (with respect to  R 
and S ) .  To see that only true global states are used, we 
can think of the bracketed query transaction T’ as being 
embedded within the pending transaction T that gener- 
ated the delta notification. In this way, the TRT proto- 
col effectively emulates a distributed two-phase locking 
protocol, ensuring serializability across sites. 
Although the TRT protocol is relatively straightfor- 
ward, and it satisfies both the safety and accuracy prop- 
erties, it has two significant drawbacks. (1) Constraint 
manager processing is synchronous with the database 
system, unlike in the previous protocols. In TRT, the 
database system must wait for the constraint checking 
protocol to  complete before it can commit its transac- 
tion and release its locks. This is a loss of autonomy, 
since progress on one site is dependent upon progress 
on the other site. (2) If R and S are updated concur- 
rently then the risk of deadlock is relatively high. The 
same deadlock cases arise as in centralized databases, 
but executing a remote transaction in a loosely-coupled 
environment may be much slower than transaction pro- 
cessing in a centralized environment, thereby increasing 
the chance of deadlock. These drawbacks are addressed 
in an extended version of the TRT protocol called MDS, 
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append change to AR 
send A notification to CMR 
receive A notification from D B R  
decide whether to run constraint check, 
if not, terminate 
open transaction on DBR,  X-locking AR 
submit Q(AR) to DBR 
receive Q(AR) from C M R  
evaluate Q(AR) 
send query result to CMR 
receive query result from DBR 
send [Q(AR,S)]  to D B s  
receive [Q(AR, S ) ]  from C M R  
execute [Q(AR, S ) ] ,  Slacking S 
commit transaction, releasing locks on S 
send query result t o  C M R  
receive result from D B s  
raise alarm if query result is non-empty 
submit DeZete(AR) to DBR 
perform DeZete(AR) 
commit transaction on DBR,  
releasing X-lock on AR 
Table 5: MDS Protocol 
Figure 6: MDS Protocol 
presented next. Another improvement to  the TRT pro- 
tocol is to  use a local t e s t  to  avoid the problems caused 
by remote transactions, described in Section 3.5. 
3.4 MDS Protocol 
Our next protocol considers the change logging dimen- 
sion of the protocol design space. In this protocol, rel- 
evant changes are “logged” in special relations that we 
call materialized delta sets. Materialized delta sets al- 
low us to  develop a version of the TRT protocol in which 
constraint checking is decoupled from database execu- 
tion, thereby addressing the drawbacks associated with 
the TRT protocol. In addition, materialized delta sets 
enable variable, application-dependent granularities for 
constraint checking. 
The Materialized Del ta  S e t  Protocol (MDS) is spec- 
ified in Table 5 and depicted in Figure 6. It behaves 
as follows. When relation R is updated, DBR appends 
the update to  the materialized delta set AR. (Here, 
AR denotes an accumulated set of changes, not just an 
individual change or set of changes.) DBR’s append to  
AR must occur before the local transaction that up- 
dates R commits. A notification A is sent to  CMB, 
indicating that an update occurred but not providing 
the actual delta set. When CMR decides to  proceed 
with constraint checking, it obtains an X-lock on AR 
for the duration of the protocol. GMR then reads AR, 
and proceeds just as in the TRT protocol, executing a 
query Q(AR, S )  within a transaction at the remote site. 
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D B R  
CMR receive AR from DBR 
D B R  
send AR to C M R ,  holding transaction 
X-locking R 
submit QL(AR, R) to D B R  
receive QL(AR,  R) from D B R  
evaluate QL(AR,  R)  
send query result to CMR 
receive query result from D B R  
IF query result is non-empty 
THEN perform TRT in same transaction 
C M R  
r - - - - - - - - - I  r - - - - - - - - - i  
I I 
--. 
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Figure 7: LTT Protocol 
After receiving the query result and raising an alarm if 
appropriate, CM, erases the current contents of mate- 
rialized delta set AR and releases its X-lock on AR. 
As in the TRT protocol, accuracy is guaranteed be- 
cause the protocol emulates distributed two-phase lock- 
ing. However, unlike in TRT, local access to  R is not 
entirely restricted while the protocol is executing. Local 
transactions that read R can execute concurrently with 
the protocol. Concurrent local transactions also can 
update R; however, because the protocol X-locks AR, 
such transactions cannot complete and commit until the 
protocol has finished. In addition, the risk of deadlock 
is much lower with MDS than with TRT [lo]. 
3.5 LTT Protocol 
The last dimension of the protocol design space we ex- 
plore is the use of local tests. Consider a delta notifi- 
cation AR. A local test is a query, QL(AR,R), such 
that if the query result is empty, then the result of the 
global constraint checking query Q(AR, S) is guaran- 
teed to be empty as well [12, 111. The test is “local” 
because it involves AR and R only, and does not require 
access to  S .  Hence, a local test can be used to avoid 
remote queries. Unfortunately, local tests are generally 
conservative,  so if a local test fails it  becomes necessary 
to issue a remote query. 
The Local Tes t  Transact ion Protocol (LTT) is speci- 
fied in Table 6 and depicted in Figure 7. The protocol 
is very similar to TRT, except before issuing the re- 
mote transaction Q(AR, s), the local test Qh(AR, R) 
is evaluated. If the local test succeeds, then the pro- 
tocol terminates successfully with no remote activity. 
Note that the local test must be evaluated within the 
same transaction in which the update occurred in or- 
der to behave correctly [ll], so a materialized delta set 
approach cannot be applied here. The safety and accu- 
racy of LTT follows from the correctness of local tests 
[12, 111, and from the safety and accuracy of TRT. 
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Figure 8: Protocols in the protocol space 
4 Analyzing the Family 
In Section 3 we developed a family of constraint check- 
ing protocols along the four dimensions of the protocol 
design space. In this section we analyze the protocols. 
First, we consider the protocols in the context of the de- 
sign space to see how complete the family is. Then we 
compare the characteristics and costs of the various pro- 
tocols, and discuss how the protocols can be extended to 
handle constraints spanning more than two databases. 
4.1 The Protocol Space 
Figure 8 places the protocols developed in Section 3 
into their appropriate positions in the four-dimensional 
protocol design space. Although several combinations 
of dimensions have been explored, not every possibility 
has been considered, as four dimensions yield sixteen 
possible protocols. 
We first point out three potentially useful protocols 
not discussed in Section 3 ,  combining features from our 
protocols in a relatively straightforward way. Change 
logging can be used with DRQ or IRQ to produce a 
Cumulat ive  R e m o t e  Query (CRQ) protocol, which ac- 
cumulates changes in a materialized delta set to allow 
variable granularities of constraint checking. Times- 
tamps and change logging can be combined to obtain 
a Times tamped  Materialized Del ta  S e t  (TMD) protocol, 
in which materialized delta sets containing timestamps 
are used in order to allow variable granularities of con- 
straint checking and to keep track of cumulative updates 
for protocol restarts. Timestamps, transaction mech- 
anisms, and local tests can be combined into a Local 
Transact ion Global T imes tamped  (LTG) protocol. LTG 
resembles LTT, except when a local test fails, times- 
tamping is used rather than transactions for the global 
query (to achieve more autonomy). 
Some points in the design space have an inappropri- 
ate combination of features: Local tests cannot be used 
without local transactions. Combining timestamps and 
transactions is “overkill” in the case where local tests 
are not used. Finally, the combination of transactions, 
change logging, and local tests yields rather complex 
protocols that we have yet to  explore. 
4.2 Comparing the Protocols 
The various protocols in the family can be compared 
with respect to what they require, and what they de- 
liver. The requirements of the protocols concern the 
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functionality of the systems within the federation and 
the functionality of the interfaces between systems: an 
interface for executing remote queries, availability of lo- 
cal database transactions, an order-preserving interface 
between each database system and its corresponding 
constraint manager, and a global clock. The proto- 
cols “deliver” certain properties: safety, accuracy, asyn- 
chrony, and flexible granularity for constraint checking. 
Table 7 summarizes the requirements and properties of 
the protocols discussed in Section 3. 
The requirements and properties discussed so far are 
static characteristics of the protocols. The protocols 
also can be compared in terms of their dynamic  char- 
acteristics, specifically their execution costs. We distin- 
guish three ingredients in the cost of a constraint check- 
ing protocol. Local messages are messages between a 
database system and its constraint manager. We distin- 
guish between notification-only messages and messages 
that convey data. R e m o t e  messages are messages be- 
tween a constraint manager and a different constraint 
manager or a remote database system. All remote mes- 
sages convey data. Database operations are operations 
performed by a local database system, where an opera- 
tion can be either a query, a database modification, or 
a transaction commit. The cost functions for the pro- 
tocols from Section 3 are shown in Table 8. Costs are 
given for a single delta notification, i.e., for one local 
update transaction triggering the protocol. 
From the analysis in Table 8 some interesting obser- 
vations can be made.Although the TRQ protocol has 
better properties than the IRQ protocol, and TRQ ap- 
pears more complex, the cost functions of the two pro- 
tocols are the same. This is explained by the fact that, 
although TRQ may need to  iterate, each iteration “con- 
sumes” a delta set that would have triggered an inde- 
pendent instance of IRQ. In practice, the actual cost 
of TRQ may be slightly higher than IRQ since TRQ 
must generate and communicate timestamps, and be- 
cause restarts in TRQ may cause larger data sets to  
be transmitted. The cost of the MDS protocol can be 
“tuned” by varying the granularity factor g ,  i.e., the 
number of delta notifications before constraint check- 
ing is initiated. This allows an application to  establish 
a constraint checking policy that balances its integrity 
requirements against the available resources. The effi- 
ciency of the LTT protocol depends heavily on the prob- 
ability p that  a local test succeeds; if p is low, the LTT 
protocol has higher cost than the TRT protocol. The 
actual value for p is strongly application-dependent. 
Our constraint checking protocols in Section 3 have 
been developed for constraints involving exactly two 
databases. It is our experience that two-site constraints 
predominate in practice. Furthermore, even when a 
constraint involves more than two databases, often it 
can be “split” into multiple constraints, each involving 
exactly two databases. There are, however, cases where 
we may need to  handle multi-site constraints. There- 
fore, it may be necessary to  extend our protocols to 
more than two sites. 
Multi-site constraints can be evaluated easily using 
the DRQ or IRQ protocol-the constraint manager sim- 
ply submits remote queries t o  the various sites and com- 
bines the results. Safety of the protocol is guaranteed 
by the same reasoning given in Section 3.1. Timestamp- 
based protocols TRQ and SRQ also can be extended in a 
straightforward way to  handle multi-site constraints: A 
restart is necessary whenever a busy status is received 
from any of the remote sites and a local update has 
occurred; safety and accuracy follow from the results 
in Section 3.2. It is less straightforward to  construct 
safe and accurate versions of the transaction-based pro- 
tocols (such as TRT) for the multi-site case. These 
protocols emulate two-phase locking, which requires co- 
ordinating local transactions across multiple sites. A 
two-phase “handshake” protocol could be used for syn- 
chronization, similar to  distributed two-phase commit. 
Alternatively, a mechanism could be used where remote 
queries are “chained” from one site t o  the next (emulat- 
ing multiple nested transactions). Unfortunately, both 
solutions incur a considerable loss of local autonomy. 
These initial observations lead us to  believe that non- 
transaction-based protocols are most suitable for con- 
straints involving more than two sites. 
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
We have described a family of cooperative constraint 
checking protocols for federated database systems. We 
have isolated two properties of constraint checking pro- 
tocols that are of primary importance: safety and ac- 
curacy. All of our protocols are safe. Obtaining ac- 
curacy requires additional mechanisms, as seen in our 
more complex protocols. In addition to  varying in terms 
of accuracy, our protocols also vary in terms of their 
requirements of the underlying systems, their level of 
asynchrony, their flexibility, and their execution costs. 
We are quite certain that no one protocol will be suit- 
able for all federated database scenarios. By providing 
a family of alternatives, one protocol can be chosen- 
and perhaps tailored-for a particular environment or 
application. By formalizing the relevant concepts, and 
by identifying and analyzing a suite of protocols, this 
paper provides a sound basis for the problem of integrity 
constraint checking in federated databases. 
Our initial work can be elaborated in a number of 
directions. We plan to  implement the protocols in a 
true loosely-coupled environment in order to  measure 
DRQ 
IRQ 
TRQ 
SRQ 
TRT 
LTT 
v 
AN 
AD 
p 
MDS 
and compare protocol performance on real systems. We 
intend to  elaborate our model for analyzing the execu- 
tion costs of the protocols by introducing and varying 
parameter values to  understand relative costs in dif- 
ferent environments. We plan to explore the issue of 
constraint repair when violations occur, Even in tradi- 
tional centralized databases, constraint repair is an im- 
portant topic of current research; in federated databases 
the problem is even more difficult. We plan to consider 
more carefully the protocols in the design space that 
we have not studied, to  further investigate protocols 
for multi-site constraints, and to  develop protocols for 
handling constraints that do not have a straightforward 
incremental form. Finally, we plan to  investigate the 
use of logical clocks instead of absolute timestamps for 
those protocols relying on synchronized time services. 
local msgs per A remote msgs per A database ops per A total cost (simplified) 
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